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Abstract 
The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain was established in 1841 to represent the interests of 
its members, many of whom were small chemist and druggist retailers. Throughout the century 
this institution attempted to influence new policies designed to control the sale of poisonous 
substances routinely held by these shopkeepers.  Using its in-house publication, the 
Pharmaceutical Journal, the Society argued for recognition of chemists and druggists as experts 
in the storage and distribution of poisons. This article examines the discursive strategy adopted 
by the Pharmaceutical Society in its attempts retain control over sale of chemicals. Its activities 
are analysed both in respect to the complex and socially embedded nature of chemical products, 
and to the technocratic nature of its claims.  
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The Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain was established in 1841 to publically 
represent the interests of its members, mainly small chemist and druggist shop owners. During 
the course of the nineteenth century, the Society took a particular interest in policy debates aimed 
at regulating the sale of poisonous substances. Throughout the century the Society utilised its in-
house publication, the Pharmaceutical Journal to publish rhetorical statements regarding the 
expertise of its members in dispensing and distributing highly toxic chemicals for household use. 
The Society launched a campaign to be recognised as the authentic source of technical 
knowledge that could best control unwanted social effects of poisons. The aim was to draw clear 
boundaries between those with technical knowledge and the wider public, as well as between 
different scientific disciplines. Strategic discourse was used to persuade the public to accept its 
authoritative expertise. This defence was necessary due to the distributed nature of chemist and 
druggist retail establishments, which stocked the substances under debate. In addition many of 
these chemicals were embedded in everyday household practices and were expected to be 
generally available to the public. These complex socio-technical configurations provided a 
difficult context for control of problematic substances. Not only was there a wide variety of 
chemicals available, for many substances there was also a lack of documented knowledge on 
safe handling beyond traditional practice.  
 
Discursive activities of the Society, aimed at exerting a strong influence on the content of new 
policy, calls into question assumptions that regulation technologies in the nineteenth century was 
necessarily technocratic in nature. This article will evaluate the role taken by the Pharmaceutical 
Society in the process of policy formulation until the passage of the Pharmacy Act 1868. It 
  
attempts to draw together theoretical concepts relating to the complexity and inflexibility of 
embedded socio-technical practices with a re-evaluation of the role of deliberative processes in 
policy formation in nineteenth century Britain. It is suggested that, in cases of socio-
technological complexity, participation in public policy formulation is strategic, argumentative 
and negotiated rather than rationalistic and conferred. Furthermore, identifying non-linearity in 
public discourse serves to elucidate how powerful interest groups attempt to influence the social 
control of technology.    
  
Complexity and chemical technologies 
Kim (2008) identifies the socially entrenched nature of chemical technologies and highlights 
difficulties involved in making changes to technologies that are commonplace in daily life. Kim 
suggests that the distributed nature of these technologies render them inflexible and resistant to 
change, for example in relation to changing policy priorities. It is suggested here that such 
inflexibility is, in fact, an outcome of complexity of the socio-technical configurations associated 
with use of easily available chemical products (for further discussion on the nature of inflexible 
technology see Collingridge, 1980). As Kim points out, 
 
‘Once technology is socially entrenched, policy makers who want to either withdraw it or 
transform it must take into consideration the inflexibility of heterogeneous technosocial 
systems entangled with the technology. If technology is seen to be highly inflexible, 
policy makers need to exercise policy practices that do not provoke a severe repulsion 
from existing technosocial systems. They should have policy tools that are able to 
expedite policy practices without enormous resistance from affected systems linked to 
  
inflexible technologies’ (Kim, 2008: 463). 
It should be noted that Kim is referring here to current technologies which are organic in nature. 
Chemical products in the nineteenth century were predominantly inorganic, although these were 
also entrenched in everyday practice. In addition, many of the readily available substances had 
been in common use for generations and were easily available from local chemist and druggist 
shops. Passage of the Pharmacy Act 1868 was an attempt to change the status quo and to control 
sale of toxic substances commonly associated with criminal and accidental poisoning. 
Identifying the inflexibility of complex relationships within a socially entrenched technology 
raises the problem of controlling risks that emerge from the very practices that embed the 
technology (Coles, 2010). As Kim (2008) points out understanding the impetus for improved 
control over such substances could reveal key issues in the process of social embedding and re-
embedding of technologies (see also Genus, 1995, 1997).  
 
Confronting complexity in socio-technical practices raises a question about the use of complexity 
concepts in qualitative analysis. Terms such as ‘self-organization’ and ‘emergence’ are already 
widespread while others such as ‘turning point’, ‘bifurcation’ and ‘non-linearity’ still require 
clarity in their application to qualitative analysis. Mackenzie (2005: 49) calls this transfer of 
terminology a ‘loose metaphorical borrowing’ by the social sciences. Hearn et al. (2003) 
describes qualitative changes to knowledge systems as ‘turbulent’ (see also Byrne, 2005). Urry 
(2002) argues for the adoption of complexity concepts by social sciences to focus attention on 
explaining specific social or systemic phenomena.  For Urry (2005: 243) processes of social 
change are uneven, non-linear, unpredictable and irreversible, with emergent properties that 
‘stem from how agents interactively respond to local configurations’. Particular interactions also 
  
influence the probability that later events will take place (see also Geyer, 2003; Nowotny, 2005). 
The dynamism and turbulence which describe the development of socio-technical configurations 
has led other commentators to suggest a historical analysis is necessary to identify the main 
determinants of change (Hirsch and Gillespie, 2001). The case presented here concerns the 
nature of fundamental social changes that were made to control availability of poisonous 
substances in the nineteenth century. The article focuses primarily on identification of how 
public discourse published by the Pharmaceutical Society could be interpreted as non-linear over 
time. Following turns in the arguments put forward by the Society reveals its strategic response 
to different iterations of proposed policies. These responses were altered in reaction to the 
unfolding situation. Both conditions of uncertainty regarding outcomes and non-linear responses 
arise from the socio-technical complexity of the situation. This also helps to explain why the 
Society needed to argue so forcefully for its expertise to be publically recognised.  
   
The relationship between rhetoric and technocracy 
Analysis of this historical episode will also contribute to understanding the nature of policy 
making to control socially embedded technologies. Millstone (2009) has pointed out that, in the 
second half of the twentieth century, the dominant model of policy for science and technology in 
Europe has been technocratic.  This approach, he states assumes ‘that scientific and technical 
considerations are not just necessary but also sufficient for policy decision-making’ (Millstone, 
2009: 625). Technocratic policy making demands that policies should be evaluated and decided 
by experts who can then advise on the appropriate course of action.  This implies that a 
politically neutral and objective expertise is of greater relevance to policy makers than input and 
commentary by specific interest groups. For Millstone technocratic decisions are based on an 
  
unexamined rhetoric of non-controversial scientific and technological knowledge, which also 
applies to policy making processes in the nineteenth century. Mulkay (1993) discusses the use of 
rhetorical positions in policy debate and identifies contradictory positions proposed by different 
interest groups in relation to decision making over the ‘embryo debate’. Even in a technocratic 
context, then, alternative rhetorics are possible (see also McNally, 2000). In addition, other 
public policy commentators have explored the use of rhetoric as a strategic tool for 
communicating a preferred interpretation of events (Americ, 2004). In public policy debates 
rhetorical strategies have been used as a means to frame issues and establish credentials, 
reputation or position. As Jeriti (2008) asserts the aim is to be entrusted with ownership of an 
issue. Dunmine (2005: 482) examines the way in which discursive processes can act to embed a 
future scenario in the present, creating potential representations, visions, or a ‘contested 
rhetorical domain’. Rhetoric therefore is understood as a political discourse which makes claims, 
assertions and declarations about future realities, or a future projected and represented. This 
article investigates how such ‘authoritative expertise’ was established by the Pharmaceutical 
Society in its attempts to influence policy and endeavours to reveal its discursive and strategic 
characteristics.  
 
Lengwiler (2008) suggests that a better understanding of the role of participation in policy 
formulation can be gained from historical analysis of changing relations between science, 
technology and government. Such an approach, he asserts helps to locate the dominant 
technocratic system as relatively recent, with precursor systems acting much more interactively. 
Lengwiler further claims that technology policies in the nineteenth century primarily 
demonstrated a concern to draw boundaries between science, technology and the wider public. 
  
Claims for expertise were often made by newly emerging professional societies and institutions,  
‘The actors of nineteenth century science were more concerned with drawing a clear 
boundary between the spheres of science and the public or between scientific and lay or 
religious knowledge, a process that parallels the secularization of natural knowledge’ 
(Lengwiler, 2008:189). 
  
Both Millstone and Lengwiler suggest that establishment of, and change in, policy regimes have 
a discursive element in which favoured relations between science and the state are strategically 
and dynamically pursued by interested groups. Their approach implies that roles and boundaries 
are negotiated, and stabilised although this stability may be challenged and boundaries redrawn 
(see Genus and Coles, 2005). These processes can be interrogated through a historical analysis of 
policy development which focuses on issues of context and contingency of participants and 
events. By identifying discursive episodes it is possible to reconstruct how rhetorical claims to 
expertise have become accepted unconditionally. Jensen (2005) refers to the potential to ‘open 
up’ the past particularly during episodes of re-description of established practices, which echoes 
Cilliers (2005) view that understanding complex socio-technical processes is facilitated by their 
deconstruction rather than their reduction to limiting frameworks. As he suggests, ‘meaning and 
knowledge cannot be fixed in a representational way but is always contingent and contextual’ 
(Cilliers, 2005: 259).  Thus it is suggested that emergence of a technocratic idiom in policy 
decisions may not be the logical outcome of a system predicated on the acceptance of objective 
recommendations from legitimate experts. Rather, it is a discursive and negotiable outcome to a 
policy issue which has itself been framed by the socio-technical contingency and complexity of a 
situation. Far from being a rationalistic enterprise predicated on the objectivity of authenticated 
  
techno-scientific knowledge, communicative interactions are made by interest groups aimed at 
drawing boundaries between their expertise and the public. Such boundaries are partly 
discursively constructed, negotiated through public communicative practices and permeable to 
‘non-experts’. The following sections attempt to examine how such processes have been utilised 
in the particular case of the Pharmaceutical Society as it strategically defended the interests of its 
members. Firstly, an outline will be given to the social context which led to call for new policies 
to regulate the availability of known poisons. The rhetorical response of the Society will then be 
considered in the light of its strategic ambitions.  
 
The social role of poisonous substances in nineteenth century Britain 
Many chemicals were generally available in the nineteenth century as such substances were 
constituents of many standard products available for domestic use. These ranged from relatively 
benign to highly toxic substances, for example opium and hydrogen chloride were commonly 
prescribed for medicinal use, while arsenic was widely used as a food colouring. Although there 
was some governmental concern about the high number of deaths arising from the unfettered 
availability of such substances, they were also regarded as socially and economically difficult to 
control. During the century chemist and druggist retailers grew in local importance. These shops 
were becoming an established part of local communities, dispensing medicinal preparations, and 
offering medical advice to their customers.  Their economic and advisory roles gave them a high 
standing in the community, and during the century the number of chemist and druggist shops 
started to increase over the country (Marland, 1987). By the mid-nineteenth century they had 
established themselves as traders supplying general household chemical goods as well as 
dispensing a range of medical preparations. However, chemist and druggist enterprises were 
  
differentiated in both size and scope. They ranged from all-purpose corner shops to large 
undertakings with wholesale and manufacturing capability more concerned with supplying 
dedicated medicinal preparations than general commerce. The nature of their specialisation in 
chemical and pharmaceutical products resulted in a protracted struggle to attain a recognised 
position as part of the emerging medical profession (Holloway, 1991). The typical stock of a 
chemist and druggist could include pharmaceutical preparations, toiletries, tobacco, herbs, oils, 
candles, dyes and paints as well as general groceries and foodstuffs. Animal remedies and other 
veterinary goods were supplied and in some cases dentistry practices were carried out at the 
premises (Homan, 2005). In some shops manufacture of medicinal goods and other chemical 
substances was common practice, and part of the premises was converted into a chemical 
laboratory. These activities necessitated a dedicated storage area for substances which were kept 
in large glass bottles, in many cases with no discrimination between lethal and less harmful 
substances (Worling, 2005). As Holloway (1991: 52) notes, proprietors ‘had to be prepared to 
practice a wide range of medical skills and to sell a diversity of products’. 
 
During the nineteenth century these establishments became vulnerable to changing social 
attitudes, particularly concerning the easy availability of the more toxic substances that they 
distributed. In addition, the role they played in dispensing medicinal preparations to the local 
community put chemists and druggists in competition with the established profession of the 
apothecary. As early as 1813 local associations of chemists and druggist were set up to oppose 
legislation that would restrict this aspect of their business. However, these organisations were 
small and lacked co-ordination until the establishment of the Pharmaceutical Society in 1841. As 
a national organisation this body had clear policies to develop the professional and defend the 
  
economic activities of this sector. The Society increased in political influence during the century 
as it developed into an organisation that was regarded as representative of the general trade, due 
partly to the public efforts of one of the founder members, Jacob Bell (Holloway, 1991). From its 
inception the Council of the Pharmaceutical Society was concerned with defending the interests 
of members against unwanted legislation that would affect the sale of chemicals.  
 
During the first half of the nineteenth century the question of criminal use of poisons became a 
cause for public concern, which led to repeated suggestions that these substances should be 
controlled by parliamentary legislation. Development of the Marsh test in 1836 which identified 
the presence of small quantities of arsenic in biological matter focused attention on this 
substance. The Marsh test appeared to provide a means to obtain conclusive indication that 
arsenic was the cause of poisoning fatalities. However, there were on-going problems with its 
deployment in legal prosecution as results were often difficult to interpret. Such uncertainty 
coupled with the on-going moral panic led to parliamentary action in the form of the Arsenic Act 
1851. This legislation was intended to protect the public against fatalities from improper use by 
documenting all sales, providing a means of tracing customers, and restricting sale to small 
quantities for domestic use (Bartrip, 1992).  However, as arsenic was only one of many 
potentially lethal substances, there was on-going concern that more general legislation was 
necessary. The response of the Pharmaceutical Society to growing public concern over the issue 
of poisoning from chemical products and the stated intention that these were to become the 
subject of new policy regulations can be divided into three phases. The first was prior to the 
Arsenic Act, in which the strategic goals for the Society were set down and agreed. The second 
between 1851 and 1868 when the Society argued publicly to be recognised as the source of 
  
expertise in the issue of chemical safety at the point of sale, and a third phase in the years 
subsequent to the Pharmacy Act 1868, when the Society drew attention to statistics that appeared 
to confirm their successful administration of the new policy arrangements. 
 
Strategy formulation      
Prior to 1851 the Society spent some effort on developing its specific approach to the problem of 
widely available, yet toxic chemical products. It devised a strategy for policy control that took 
into account issues of concern to its members and would give administration of new regulations 
to the Society itself.  A statement of objectives was made and these aims were reported as a clear 
and rational means of control. They were defended and reiterated through the pages of the 
Society’s own publication, the Pharmaceutical Journal until they were finally achieved.   The 
first point was to retain support for continued availability of all substances traditionally 
purchased in chemists’ shops. This point was based on the economic necessity of such chemicals 
and on the argument that chemists should be regarded as having the expertise to control supply.  
The Pharmaceutical Society supported availability of such substances because of their 
commercial value, especially in agricultural districts where they were in general use (Anon (a), 
1844/5).  It was felt that the main problems facing a new policy for control was the difficulty of 
defining which substances should be considered poisons and their commercial importance, 
  
 Many tons of arsenic and sulphate of copper are annually employed for agricultural  
 purposes. Many other highly deleterious substances are extensively used in the arts and 
 manufactures and although every precaution ought to be taken to avoid accidents in the 
 use of these articles, the prohibition of their sale, even if practicable, would be attended 
  
 with very serious commercial inconvenience (Anon (b), 1844/5: 341). 
 
One issue was potential resistance of the public to changes in the availability of commonly used 
remedies, as the British public ‘would be indignant if they could not take a calomel pill or a dose 
of James’ powder without consulting a doctor’ (Ibid: 346). The scope of the problem was 
illustrated by the fact that between 1837 and 1838 more than one third of all cases of poisoning 
were estimated to have been caused by arsenic (Anon (c), 1849/50). Other known poisons in 
common use included oxalic acid, salts of sorrel, salts of mercury, copper, lead, potassium 
cyanide, iodine, and oil of vitriol. The Pharmaceutical Journal suggested that the word poison 
should be marked on such substances to acquaint the purchaser of its properties. They could be 
distinguished by being kept in blue bottles, and marked ‘for external use only’. Remedies which 
could not be sold through a physician should carry notification of prescribed doses (Anon (d), 
1844/5).  However, growing public alarm relating to the use of arsenic in murder cases forced the 
Society to articulate support for specific regulation of this substance, reiterating the key role of 
the retailers, 
 
We fully agree…. That much difficulty and inconvenience would attend the introduction 
of a comprehensive law for restricting the sale of poisons generally; but if we may judge 
from the cases of poisoning reported almost daily in the public papers, there are good 
grounds for believing that a proper restriction on the sale of arsenic by retail would be the 
means of preventing at least nine-tenths of the criminal poisoning which now occur 
(Anon (e), 1847/8: 142). 
 
  
The focus on arsenic was a tactical move away from earlier pronouncements on general control 
of poisons in response to increasing public pressure for a specific policy for this particular 
substance. In part, it was a response to, and an acknowledgement of, the wider social disquiet 
that had been developing over the use of arsenic in so-called cases of ‘secret poisoning’. These 
concerns had been fuelled in part by publicity surrounding problems with using the Marsh Test 
in high profile murder cases (Bartrip, 1992). The Pharmaceutical Journal noted: 
 
In consequence of the numerous cases of secret poisoning which have lately become 
public, a variety of plans have been suggested with a view of placing some check upon 
this destructive crime (Anon (c), 1849/50: 160).  
 
There was also growing awareness that cheap cost, easy availability and range of common 
domestic uses were contributing to the increasing use of arsenic in suicide cases and accidental 
poisoning. During the 1840s the Registrar General continually attributed one third of such 
fatalities to arsenic (Holloway, 1991). The issue of arsenic had clearly disassociated itself from 
more general concerns regarding stocking and retailing other potentially lethal substances. These 
developments enabled the Society to put forward the second plank of its preferred strategy for 
control, introduction of an Act of Parliament to regulate the qualifications of chemists and 
druggists. Such an Act, it was suggested, would ensure that most lethal poisons were kept 
separately, and substances would be labelled correctly (Anon (f), 1848/9). The Society expected 
chemists would oppose moves to control arsenic on commercial grounds, and because of fears 
that such a law might be inoperative. They could also object to singling out just one poison, as 
was noted in the Pharmaceutical Journal, 
  
 
Accidental poisoning is overlooked, the education and examination of those who deal in 
poisons is deemed a matter of no moment, and opium, aconite, lobelia, hemlock and 
nightshade, with a thousand other deadly drugs, may be sold without restraint by ignorant 
persons, provided always that a prohibition is placed on the sale of arsenic by granting a 
licence to sell it (Anon (c): 163).   
 
In an early example of strategic co-operation, however, the Pharmaceutical Society, acting 
jointly with the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association, set up a committee to consider the 
practicability of adopting measures for preventing accidental and criminal poisoning (Anon (g), 
1849/50) , although it was noted, 
 
It was not to be expected that all parties would at once acquiesce in the property of 
legislative enactment interfering in some degree with their business arrangements, still 
less was it to be expected that all would agree as to precise nature of the regulations most 
calculated to produce the desired effect (ibid: 297). 
 
It subsequently became clear that many members of the Society had already adopted similar 
practices to those being considered. A meeting between the committee of the Provincial Medical 
and Surgical Association and the Committee of the Pharmaceutical Society managed to agree on 
a common definition of the problem, which suited the two institutions, ‘to confine 
recommendations to arsenic, enshrining the role of the retail trade, as the sale of arsenic retail 
should be restricted to medical men and chemists and druggists’ (ibid: 452). It was resolved to 
  
send the recommendations to the Secretary of State, and noted that this had also been done by the 
Provincial Medical and Surgical Association. The Earl of Carlisle introduced the first reading of 
the Bill to Regulate the Sale of Arsenic in March 1851, in the hope that debate would be limited 
to avoid publicising potential criminal uses of the substance. However, the two Societies 
continued to pressure Lord Carlisle until the, Bill was amended to reflect their joint 
recommendations. The Arsenic Act received Royal Assent in June 1851 (Bartrip, 1992). On 
reflection the Pharmaceutical Society felt that the policy of co-operation had been better than the 
two Societies opposing each other on practical grounds, although it was still concerned that the 
Act would be inoperable until there was a means of defining and regulating the quality of 
chemists and druggists (Holloway, 1991).  
 
Influence of the Pharmaceutical Society on the control of poisons 1851-1868 
The need to control availability of other poisons besides arsenic was soon raised as an issue. 
However, problems were identified, both of defining which substances were poisons, and of 
deciding which of these should be restricted. The Pharmaceutical Society suggested one of two 
approaches could be chosen: 
 
If the sale of poisons is to be dealt with by law, then the law must either give a list of the 
poisons to which it applies, in which case it must be a law for regulating the sale of 
certain poisons, or it must give a definition of what a poison is, and leave it to the 
discretion of the retailer to decide what drugs fall under that category (Bath, 1856: 258).  
 
Clearly the Society was highlighting the issue of utilising appropriate knowledge and expertise 
  
and offering the choice between a static but legal definition via a negative list or a more 
interpretive definition based on expert assessment.  A Sale of Poisons Bill was introduced in 
1857, but it did not meet with support of the profession as it made no distinction between 
qualified and unqualified chemists (Anon (h), 1857/8). Expanding the terms of control at the 
point of sale to a wider range of substances meant a return to the issue of qualifications. The 
Pharmaceutical Society stated that it, 
 
Had always advocated judicious legislation on the sale of poisons and medicines 
generally, but maintained that, unless judicious, and in the right direction, legislation was 
likely to increase the evil by directing attention to the subject and also by removing the 
existing responsibility from the vendors of drugs (Anon (j), 1857/8: 417). 
 
The Society was also vocal against potential legislation that affected chemists alone warning 
that:  
 
The morbid nervousness which prevails at the present time about the public safety leads 
its votaries into some rather strange inconsistencies. The true and legitimate object of the 
poisons bill is to protect the public in England against injury arising from crime and 
carelessness in the use of dangerous drugs. Patent medicines are excluded from the 
operation of the Bill yet many of these contain powerful and poisonous ingredients in a 
form very convenient for the criminal and liable to accident in the hands of careless 
persons (ibid: 201). 
 
  
It was suggested that lack of standard prescriptions would leave untrained chemists to worry 
about poisonous dose levels. Drawing a contrast with a wider public who were thought to be 
uninformed and therefore ignorant of the nature of such substances they might purchase was one 
way of making the issue plain, 
 
It appears from the tenor of information received that the public are fortunately ignorant 
of the nature and mode of employment of poisons in general as such, and the committee 
doubt very much the policy of extending this knowledge by the publication of a long 
schedule of poisons with various particulars of a suggestive nature in the accomplishment 
of this object: While on the other hand, the chef security of the public consists in the 
discretion and intelligence of the qualified vendor of poisons, who in self defence, as well 
as from higher motives is constrained to adopt precautions which no Act of parliament 
could define so completely as to constitute a safeguard equal to the moral responsibility 
now existing (ibid: 452). 
 
The Society objected to the establishment of a poisons schedule which had been recommended 
both by the Board of Health and by medical practitioners, but favoured the idea that a Board of 
Examiners should be set up to examine and license pharmaceutical chemists. It considered that 
the attempts at legislation, passing through the House of Lords only betrayed ignorance of such 
matters, 
 
Their Lordships had probably never entered a laboratory; certainly they had never 
discharged the duties of assistants in a Chemists shop or they would not betray so much 
  
ignorance on what they were legislating (ibid: 441). 
 
Opposition to the 1857 Bill by the Pharmaceutical Society resulted in its modification and 
agreement to set up a Board of Examiners creating a new qualification – the ‘Licensed Druggist’. 
However the Society objected to the fact that the board of six examiners was only to have one 
representative from pharmacy (Anon (j), 1898). This Bill was eventually withdrawn, although in 
1858 an amended Sale of Poisons Bill was introduced which included a schedule of poisons. 
This was also defeated in part due to communications from the Pharmaceutical Society. 
However, legislation was felt to be necessary, and it was noted,  
 
While the areas of poisoning by arsenic had so much decreased in number, deaths from 
other poisons had become considerably more frequent (Anon (k), 1858/9:483). 
 
In 1864 two Bills were promoted regarding the registration of chemists and druggists. The 
United Society of Chemists and Druggists wanted control over the sale of certain poisons while 
the Pharmaceutical Society wanted to restrict the compilation of prescriptions to registered 
chemists and druggists. The House of Commons Select Committee suggested that the two should 
present a more untied front before a new Bill could be introduced (Anon (j), 1898). In addition, 
the growing realisation that poisoning remained a social problem resulted in support for the 
examination and registration of qualified chemists and druggists. Sir John Simon, Medical 
officer to the Board of Health, had requested a report investigating the competencies of persons 
retailing drugs and poisons, which highlighted lack of regulation and training. In response, 
Simon gave his support to the Pharmaceutical Society to become an ‘exclusive, regulatory 
  
organisation under the close supervision of the Privy Council’ (Holloway, 1991: 230). This 
support gave a favourable context for the Society’s amended Bill (supported by the United 
Society of Chemists and Druggists) to regulate the sale of poisons and alter and amend the 
Pharmacy Act 1852, which was introduced to the House of Lords in May 1868. The Bill was 
steered by the Liberal politician, Lord Granville who was both a supporter of the Pharmaceutical 
Society and a friend of John Simon (Holloway, 1991). Supporters of the Bill hoped for easy 
progress through parliament and the House of Lords debate on the third reading on June 8th was 
relatively uncontested. A suggestion by Lord Redesdale that poisons should be stored in an 
easily recognised ‘poisons bottle’ was rejected. The gave the Duke of Marlborough opportunity 
to voice his support for the Pharmaceutical Society’s expertise, as he felt it would be better ‘to 
leave it to the discretion of the Pharmaceutical Society and the Privy Council to take what 
precautions they thought necessary against the careless sale of poisons’ (Hansard, 1868a). A 
more intense debate was raised in the House of Commons due mainly to the interjections and 
amendments from Robert Lowe who wanted to see the Privy Council’s role strengthened in 
administering any legislation. In particular, he wanted an amendment which would enable the 
Privy Council to propose regulations for keeping, dispensing and selling poisons. However, this 
suggestion was rejected in favour of leaving these activities with the Pharmaceutical Society 
(Holloway, 1991). Support for the expertise of the Society in its knowledge of poisons was 
demonstrated again when Lowe proposed that restrictions introduced in the Arsenic Act should 
be applied to all poisons. Lord Elcho, who was sponsoring the Bill in the House of Commons, 
felt that these restrictions were too stringent and replied, 
 
(the) Pharmaceutical Society—a body of gentlemen in daily practice, and to whom (lie 
  
(sic) public were under great obligations—considered requisite, establishing, as it did, the 
proper medium between drawing the law so tightly that it must break in their hands and 
that laxity which would be prejudicial to the whole community. He was informed that the 
Arsenic Act was too stringent, and was practically a dead letter (Hansard, 1868b) 
 
The Pharmacy Act received Royal Assent in July 1868, required that all chemists must submit to 
registration, and the sale of poisons was restricted to qualified persons. The Pharmaceutical 
Society was in agreement, as they had, 
 
Ever endeavoured to raise their status by enforcing a better qualification, to maintain it 
and by promoting that union among them which has now been accomplished after many 
years of anxious exertion (Anon (l), 1868/9: 49). 
 
The Act set up the Poisons Schedule, a list of substances that were to be treated as potentially 
lethal. The Council of the Pharmaceutical Society could make a resolution for any substance to 
be added to the list and submit it to the Privy Council for approval. It would then be advertised in 
the London and Edinburgh Gazettes, and after one month it became a scheduled poison under the 
Act. Poisons were to be labelled with the name and address of the vendor, sales were to be 
entered on a register, and certain substances could only be sold to persons known to the seller. 
The Pharmaceutical Society was charged with the administration of the Act and the examination 
and registration of chemists (ibid). There had been some pressure within the House of Commons 
for the role of the Privy Council, as a government department, to be extended over the role of the 
Pharmaceutical Society, who was thought to have only the welfare of small traders at heart. This 
  
was not a popular move, however, as the Pharmaceutical Journal noted, 
 
…. What is proposed is to get rid of the Pharmaceutical Society in this matter, and then to 
enact that another gentleman, the medical officer of the Privy Council, for that will be the 
effect of it, shall by his own ipse dixit declare what is a poison and what is not (ibid: 58).  
 
The services of the Pharmaceutical Society were retained, as was the approach of compiling a 
negative list of substances, 
 
Some critics have chosen to call it absurd to select just thirteen poisons for legislation and 
leave vastly larger numbers unfettered. We would remind them that the object was to 
restrict those articles most commonly used for criminal purposes, and to impose as little 
inconvenience as might be on the trade (Anon (m), 1869/70: 315). 
 
The Pharmaceutical Society’s review 
The Pharmacy Act 1868 finally resolved the issue of whom should be in control of supplying 
potentially toxic substances to the public. The Pharmaceutical Society was careful to defend the 
status quo which had tipped the balance in its favour. In 1891, keen to show the system was 
working successfully, the Society published some statistics. Of 876 deaths by poisoning in that 
year, 544 of these were accidental, and accounted for 3.25% of all deaths by accident. The 
largest proportion was from narcotic poisons, (114 or 21% of the total), 48 (9%) by carbolic acid 
and mineral acid, 2 by oxalic acid, 8 by arsenic and 7 by chloral. In addition, 16% were found to 
be caused by articles not on the poison schedule (Anon (n), 1892/3: 611). The problems of 
  
definition were still not overcome, however, 
 
The question as to the quantity of a poison by which a preparation becomes a poison 
within the meaning of the Act, is one difficult to decide. The terms of the Act are 
absolute, and do not take accounts of quantity or proportion. Strictly speaking therefore 
the presence of a statutory poison in infinitesimal amount would be legally sufficient to 
bring a preparation within the scope of the act (Anon (o), 1892/3: 227). 
 
The Society complained that the rigidity of the system allowed some toxic substances to be sold 
unchecked because they were not on the Poisons Schedule, while even dilute solutions of 
scheduled substances had to be labelled. Other problems had come to light as the position of 
chemists and druggists changed. In 1867 of the 13,000 on the register, less than 200 had passed 
the examination of the Privy Council, although by 1897, 12,080 had passed out of a possible 
15,215 chemists. However, a number of limited companies had developed to trade as chemists 
and these fell outside the scope of the Act (Anon (o), 1899: 13). Between 1868 and 1900 there 
were two attempts to pass amending legislation, but these were successfully opposed by the 
Pharmaceutical Society with the support of chemists. The philosophy of the Society to control 
the distribution of poisons was summed up in 1868, 
 
Any further amendment of the Pharmacy and Poison laws of the country should only be 
proceeded with by the Government after consulting those who are most deeply interested 
in the matter and in any case it should ever be borne in mind that the elucidation and 
proper qualification of the vendor cannot be improved upon as means of protection for 
  
the public in connection with the sale and dispensing of poisons (Anon (j), 1898: 194) 
 
The policies that emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century, developed due both to the 
interests of a strong professional group, and the lack of well defined scientific understanding of 
the nature of poisons. The Pharmaceutical Society was concerned with improving the 
professional status of its members through examination and licensing, as well as obtaining 
control over the scheduling of poisons. It was successful in retaining administration of the 
Poisons Schedule, due to the reluctance of the government to include any general scientific 
definition of poisonous substances, and the decision to take a pragmatic course using a list of 
restricted substances.  
 
Discussion  
This paper has reflected on the status of chemical technologies in response to Kim’s (2008) 
observations that their social entrenchment and inflexibility gives rise to a periodic requirement 
to enact policy change in uncertain contexts. The need to control the sale of poisons in nineteenth 
century Britain has been taken as an example of this type of situation. The specific role of the 
Pharmaceutical Society, which participated in policy debates in favour of their chemist and 
druggist membership, has been identified as a powerful organisation prepared to put forward 
strategic argumentation regarding their expertise. This was achieved by making continual 
statements about a preferred future policy. Such discourse can be understood as an attempt to 
minimise the risks inherent in complex socio-technical change. Kleinberg (2007) suggests that 
interpretation of historical texts should place emphasis on uncertainties and interpretations of 
meaning. Such writings should be viewed as a site of contestation and struggle full of 
  
‘unconscious, unquestioned or implicit assumptions’ (Kleinberg, 2007: 114) rather than that of 
asserted order and clarity of meaning. The case presented here has attempted to analyse 
rhetorical statements that were made over a period of time in order to counter a general 
perception that socio-technical policies are essentially an expression of authoritative, objective 
and certified knowledge. Persistent and attentive communications from the Society eventually 
culminated in the passage of the Pharmacy Act 1868, legislation which enshrined the role of the 
Society in its administration. However, achieving this outcome had required adoption of a clear 
and strategic rhetorical approach in which certain objectives were flexibly altered and reset over 
time, demonstrating how strategic objectives are pursued in a non-linear manner in temporal 
terms in a complex socio-technical environment. The competitive, strategic and negotiated 
aspects to achieving the legitimacy to speak for medical knowledge have also been identified in 
North America (see Whooley, 2013). 
 
Without insights into the arguments put forward by the Pharmaceutical Society this episode of 
policy formulation could be interpreted as linear, rational and progressive.  Public policy is 
enacted initially to regulate the sale of one poison, arsenic and then provisions are extended to 
incorporate a wider list of designated toxic substances. However, the public statements of the 
Society expose this linear explanation as overly simplistic. The Society had articulated a strategy 
in the 1840s, prior to the passage of the Arsenic Act, indicating its support for a policy to control 
sale of certain designated poisons. It had also stated its intention to argue for policy that would 
not harm the economic interests of its members and would also recognise and support their 
expertise in administering controls at the point of sale. Public health, it was argued, would be 
best served through professionalisation of chemists and druggists, raising standards of technical 
  
expertise and introducing new qualifications. From the point of view of the Pharmaceutical 
Society, the fact that arsenic became singled out for control hindered the straightforward 
adoption of their policy aims. Support for the Arsenic Act can therefore be seen as a tactical 
retreat, forcing longer term goals into temporary abeyance, a hedging approach which served to 
retain the Society’s influence on policy formulation. Subsequently, between 1851 and the 
passage of the Pharmacy Act in 1868, the Society returned to its original priorities, restating the 
strategic objective of retaining control of poisonous substances at the point of sale, distributed by 
professionals. During this period the Society actively opposed counter suggestions and co-
operated with organisations as far as they shared common aims. The relative balance of 
responsibilities it shared with the Privy Council demonstrates how successful it had become in 
developing wider social and political recognition of its particular area of expertise. The necessity 
and flexibility to adapt to changes in political conditions illustrates that, for the Pharmaceutical 
Society, this episode was a non-linear experience through which it had to negotiate a way 
towards their preferred outcome. Such non-linearity gives support to Kim’s (2008) concept that 
widely distributed chemical products are an example of socio-technical complexity. In addition, 
the fact that the Society had to continue to defend its position after 1868 by opposing suggested 
changes and by publicising a statement of success indicates that the situation was not a rational 
handing of power to an expert body, rather than an argumentative position not yet securely won.  
 
Conclusion 
By identifying the strategic intent behind rhetorical discourse, it is possible to review the 
argumentation that culminated in the Pharmaceutical Society’s invitation to administer the 
Pharmacy Acts. Following the discourse leads away from conventional interpretations of the 
  
linearity and rationality of this step, towards understanding the Society’s strategic intent, in 
which long term objectives become temporarily eclipsed by short term compromise. The 
Pharmaceutical Society maintained a vision of a future situation in which it would enjoy the trust 
and reputation of a body with professional prowess. However, this is achieved through the twists 
and turns of actions and responses. This case helps to elucidate issues about the nature of 
technology policies raised by both Lengwiler (2008) and Millstone (2009). As Lengwiler 
suggests this  nineteenth century discourse firmly argues for recognition of technical expertise as 
a legitimate authority separate both from common knowledge of either an educated class or the 
wider public. The necessity to state and restate this position is an iterative process which aims to 
be persuasive in relation to other powerful groups. This case exposes the pre-conditions for 
technocracy, which Millstone identifies as an unquestioning acceptance of rationalistic scientific 
knowledge that would dominate policy during the following century. 
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